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Tactical Scientific Decision-Making
during Crewed Astrobiology Mars Missions
A.H. Stevens,1 S.E. Kobs Nawotniak,2 W.B. Garry,3 S.J. Payler,1 A.L. Brady,4
M.J. Miller,5 K.H. Beaton,6 C.S. Cockell,1 and D.S.S. Lim7
Abstract
The limitations placed upon human explorers on the surface of Mars will necessitate a methodology for scientific
exploration that is different from standard approaches to terrestrial fieldwork and prior crewed exploration of the
Moon. In particular, the data transmission limitations and communication latency between Earth andMars create a
unique situation for surface crew in contact with a terrestrial science team. The BASALT research program
simulated a series of extravehicular activities (EVAs) in Mars analog terrains under various Mars-relevant
bandwidth and latency conditions to investigate how best to approach this problem. Here we discuss tactical
decision-making under these conditions, that is, how the crew on Mars interacts with a team of scientists and
support personnel on Earth to collect samples of maximum scientific interest. We describe the strategies, protocols,
and tools tested in BASALT EVAs and give recommendations on how best to conduct human exploration of Mars
with support from Earth-based scientists. We find that even with scientists supporting them, the crew performing
the exploration must be trained in the appropriate scientific disciplines in order to provide the terrestrial scientists
with enough information to make decisions, but that with appropriate planning and structure, and tools such as a
‘‘dynamic leaderboard,’’ terrestrial scientists can add scientific value to an EVA, even under Mars communication
latency. KeyWords: Decision-making—Mars—Science operations—EVA—Tactical. Astrobiology 19, 369–386.
1. Introduction
NASA currently has plans to launch a crewed missionto Mars in the coming decades (Craig et al., 2015), with
the goal of in situ scientific analysis leading into sample re-
turn. Unlike during the Apollo missions, when astronauts sent
to the surface of the Moon were rarely scientists by training
(El-Baz, 2011; Lofgren et al., 2011), the crews of future Mars
missions are likely to include astronauts with professional
backgrounds or significant experience in relevant sciences
such as geology and biology, both critical fields in the search
for life on other planets. Extravehicular activities (EVAs)
conducted by astronauts on Mars will require the astronauts
to be more flexible and adaptive and to adopt a larger degree
of autonomy than in EVAs conducted to date, due to the
working environment introduced by non-negligible com-
munication latency and bandwidth limitations between
Mars and Earth. While astronauts onMars will operate more
independently than Apollo astronauts, they will still be
expected to receive guidance from a team of experts on
Earth gathered into a Mission Support Center (MSC) (Ep-
pler et al., 2013; Yingst et al., 2013) due to the limitations of
training future astronauts in the sheer breadth and depth of
science that will be required for effective astrobiological
and geological exploration.
An effectively organized and trained MSC can support
astronauts with tactical decision-making during an EVA to
guide them toward the best possible sampling decisions, as
long as the EVAs are designed to consider this input in re-
lation to the latency experienced between the crew and the
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MSC. Various setups and communication schemes between a
terrestrial MSC and extravehicular astronauts have been de-
veloped and tested during previous real and analog planetary
exploration missions (e.g., Eppler, 2011; Lim et al., 2011),
but the communication latency between any teams on Earth
and Mars presents a significant challenge to effective com-
munication and decision-making. This challenge is only en-
hanced by the uniquely complicated task of astronauts
performing aseptic sampling in environments more extreme
than any on Earth. Searching for and selecting the samples
that could hold evidence for life requires tactical planning and
well-established protocols between the crew on Mars and the
MSC, given that the time available to actually conduct sci-
ence may be relatively limited in the timeline of the entire
surface mission (Eppler, 2011). The process of collecting
samples with astrobiological implications will also be more
time intensive than sample collection during Apollo; and
when combined with restrictions on both forward contami-
nation (for planetary protection reasons) and cross-
contamination in order to reduce scientific uncertainty
(Rummel, 2001; Rummel et al., 2014; Kminek and Rummel,
2015), as well as the technological limitations of in situ
analysis and mass restrictions of sample return, the crew will
need to be judicious in their approach for sample selection.
Previous analog investigations have tended to (understand-
ably) focus primarily on science questions and the technical
methods used to answer those questions, but relatively few
have focused on the operational and human factors that in-
fluence the decisions that must be made in this process (e.g.,
Lim et al., 2010; Thiel et al., 2011). However, more work is
this arena is required, since the standard protocol that ter-
restrial field science generally follows might not be most
appropriate or effective for application to extraterrestrial ex-
ploration missions, and should be critically appraised and
developed before humans are sent to other planets.
During the NASA Biologic Analog Science Associated
with Lava Terrains (BASALT) research program, we con-
ducted scientific research under crewed mission simulations,
including an expected minimum and maximum communi-
cation latency between Earth and Mars. Here, we describe how
tactical decisions were made in concert by the ‘‘terrestrial’’
MSC and the ‘‘martian’’ crew during two BASALT deploy-
ments to Mars analog field sites. Tactical decisions are those
made within the context of a single EVA, whereas strategic
decisions are made before and between a series of EVAs.
Examining the tactical decision-making in the BASALT sim-
ulated EVAs provides input into how best to plan future as-
trobiological sampling EVAs in crewed missions to Mars.
2. Background
Current plans for Mars exploration involve robotic precur-
sors (Fong et al., 2010) followed by human exploration (Drake
et al., 2010; National Research Council, 2012). As the ques-
tion of life on Mars is one of the highest priorities for space
agencies around the world (International Space Exploration
Coordination Group, 2013), it is inevitable that these crewed
surface missions will involve some astrobiological sampling.
An astrobiological (rather than purely geological, as in
the Apollo missions) focus will place a number of scientific
requirements on a crewed Mars mission. Astronauts will have
to collect a suite of samples representative of a given location
to ensure scientific reliability and to account for the limita-
tions of biological analyses, using techniques that do not
degrade or damage potentially important biosignatures. They
will have to apply a range of life-detection techniques (that
may not exist yet) to the samples, whether in situ, in a lab
located in a Mars base, or on Earth after sample return, and
allow the information from these samples to be combined
with environmental information, such as contextual geochem-
istry, to give a full understanding of the past or present ecology
of the sampling site. The mission will be limited in the
number of samples that can be returned to Earth for detailed
laboratory analysis due to mass restrictions (Moores et al.,
2012), so each sample suite will have to be chosen carefully
and possibly down-selected from the full range collected.
In addition to the astrobiological sampling requirements,
the astronauts will have to deal with contamination issues.
The most likely places on Mars (by our current under-
standing) to harbor life are currently defined as Special
Regions because they are also most likely to be contam-
inated, interfering with any extant ecosystem and poten-
tially ‘‘spoiling’’ science return (Rummel et al., 2014).
This means that the methodologies for these crewed mis-
sions must also aim to reduce the possibility of forward and
cross contamination.
The requirements and limitations placed on these future
crewed surface missions will create a unique work envi-
ronment for the astronauts, one that we can plan and test
protocols for in advance using analog missions. One aspect
of the BASALT program was to identify how to best meet
astrobiological sampling requirements while maintaining
adequate contamination control measures and impacting as
little as possible on science return.
When compared to other exploration contexts, the context
of advanced planetary field geology and biology sampling
places particular importance on real-time adaptive planning,
high levels of geological expertise, and advanced tools and
in situ analysis (Hodges and Schmitt, 2011; Schmitt et al.,
2011). A common work environment with multiple opera-
tors requires constant cycles of communication, action, and
feedback (Hollnagel, 1998), and previous studies have iden-
tified prior scientific training of nonspecialists as a critical
component in the scientific success of simulated EVAs (Love
and Bleacher, 2013; Yingst et al., 2013).
In this manuscript, we discuss how tactical decisions can
be made collaboratively between crew on ‘‘Mars’’ in con-
cert with a MSC on Earth as a means to ensure desired
science return. We define tactical decisions as those made
within a planned EVA, where the time horizon goes beyond
present needs but is limited to within the EVA (Hollnagel,
1998), under the time constraints associated with round-trip
communications latencies and other operational restrictions
representative of Mars surface operations (Beaton et al.,
2019a). An overview of the structure of the BASALT pro-
gram, which included such modules as astronaut training,
communications infrastructure and software development,
operational testing, and science, is described in Lim et al.
(2019). The scientific context for our objectives is described
in Hughes et al. (2019), and more detail of the strategic
planning and decision-making is described in Brady et al.
(2019). The layout and functioning of the MSC, as well as
how it was adapted in response to changing needs, is described
in Payler et al. (2019), and the concepts of operations
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(ConOps) for how the EVAs were run are described in
Beaton et al. (2019a). Here we examine the influence of the
conditions imposed by the mission architecture on scientific
decision-making at different stages during an EVA. We look
at how this decision-making process responded to the re-
quirements placed on it by sterile sampling, mission flight
rules, communications latency, and bandwidth limitations to
achieve meaningful geobiological sampling under simulated
mission constraints. We identify key insights from our
simulations that aim to inform future mission planning from
the perspective of tactical scientific decision-making.
3. Methods
The operational and decision-making structure used by
the BASALT program has been developed over time from a
range of experiences including the Apollo missions, various
Mars rover missions, and a number of analog studies in ter-
restrial and aquatic environments (Clark, 2010; Lim et al.,
2011; Bleacher et al., 2013; Eppler et al., 2013; Yingst et al.,
2013; Beaton et al., 2017). While top-level scientific pri-
orities are made by the Mars-based crew and Earth-based
support personnel in concert during the planning stages, the
communication latency introduced in a Mars mission dra-
matically shifts the decision-making process during EVA
execution from what has previously been used in terrestrial,
lunar, or robotic Mars missions. The complete operational
structure is described in detail elsewhere (Beaton et al.,
2019a) but is summarized here where it relates to decision-
making. Personnel in our team ranged from undergraduate
students to astronauts with in-orbit experience but together
formed a group of around 70 people with hundreds of years
of experience in disciplines critical to the BASALT pro-
gram, such as space operations, communications and data
networks, geology, and biology. More details of the per-
sonnel forming the EV, IV, and MSC teams and their re-
spective interactions are given in the works of Beaton et al.
(2019a) and Payler et al. (2019).
The two main scientific decision-making ‘‘units’’ during
BASALT EVAs were the Extra-Vehicular (EV) and Intra-
Vehicular (IV) crew as one unit in communication in real
time (EV/IV), and the MSC. Each EV and IV pairing was
formed of one operationally focused crew member (EV1 &
IV1) and one scientifically focused crew member (EV2 &
IV2), each with particular responsibilities. These pairs of
crew members remained consistent through a deployment
and rotated between positions in EV, IV, and MSC. This
allowed the EV/IV pairs to develop a partnership and ensured
they had insight into how each team worked and commu-
nicated. During our BASALT simulated EVAs, EV/IV crew
and the MSC were separated in space and, depending on the
particular simulation parameters, varying degrees of time,
in addition to having limitations on data transmission rates
between them.
The low and high latency conditions investigated in
BASALT operations are 5 and 15min one-way light time
(OWLT) communication latency, which fall within the 4–
22min OWLT delays experienced between Earth and Mars
due to orbital alignment. The bandwidth transmission re-
strictions are a conservative case of 0.512Mb/s uplink and
1.54Mb/s downlink, representing low-cost communications
infrastructure, and a high bandwidth case of 5.0Mb/s uplink
and 10.0Mb/s downlink, representing abilities upgraded from
current infrastructure. Full details of the reasoning behind
the BASALT ConOps is given in the work of Beaton et al.
(2019a).
Each EVA had a set of clearly outlined science objectives
that were determined at a strategic level prior to EVA ex-
ecution (Brady et al., 2019). Science objectives in each
EVA were for EV crew to find and sample particular types
of altered basalt, returning with one or two sample suites
used to investigate the relationship between geochemistry
and microbial habitability in basaltic environments. More
detailed scientific questions were developed for the program
(Lim et al., 2019), but during an EVA the top-level question
was divided into specific targets for the crew to identify.
Having nonsimulated scientific objectives for the fieldwork
that formed our simulated missions meant that we could
more accurately determine how these scientific questions
were affected by the operational limitations imposed by the
mission protocols.
Overlaid on our science objectives were a set of defined
procedures and flight rules, which maintained consistency
between EVAs. These procedures told each crew member
what they needed to do at each stage of the EVA, and the
flight rules determined operational limits such as ‘‘hard stop’’
and ‘‘no-go’’ conditions (Beaton et al., 2017).
Under communication latency, the sequencing of com-
munications between two parties becomes important to
avoid confusion (Love and Reagan, 2013), as otherwise the
two parts of a conversation will arrive out of sequence.
Previous analog operations have found that this sequencing
becomes untenable with voice communications between the
MSC and EV crew members, hence the MSC communicated
with IV crewmembers across the time delay using a text-based
system, whereas EV and IV crew remained in real-time voice
communication. The MSC heard all the communication be-
tween the EV and IV crew members, and IV could, if desired,
direct voice communication to the MSC; but the MSC did not
communicate with the EV crew via voice. Since precise and
consistent voice communications that use pre-established
terms are important, especially in a low-bandwidth condi-
tion where interference or lost packets can disrupt commu-
nications (Love and Bleacher, 2013), all EV/IV crew were
trained in appropriate radio language using a protocol doc-
ument assembled by the operations researchers based on
previous programs and missions.
The BASALT research program used a number of tools to
enhance our communications and collaboration between
the EV/IV crew and MSC and assist with decision-making.
The Minerva software platform, developed for and during
the BASALT research program, was created from software
used in a number of prior analog missions, incorporating three
components—Playbook, xGDS, and SEXTANT. These com-
ponents were used in various strategic and tactical planning
contexts throughout the BASALT program. Playbook is a
scheduling and real-time execution tool as well as a text
communication interface (Mission Log) that accounts for
OWLT latency between users in different locations and is
described in detail in the work of Marquez et al. (2019). The
Playbook Mission Log (which also automatically logs all the
messages) is the main method of communication between
the MSC and the EV/IV crew. xGDS (eXploration Ground
Data Systems) is a combined set of tools for mapping;
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traverse planning; real-time visualization of EV crew loca-
tion, activity, telemetry, and scientific data; note taking; and
includes a data archive for later analysis (Deans et al.,
2017). xGDS is the main scientific data system used by the
MSC, as it shows them the location of the EV crew on a map
(which can include multiple geographical data layers), dis-
plays the real-time video (if available), and catalogs the still
images and instrument data sent back by the EV crew.
SEXTANT is a path planning tool that aims to optimize
traverse over terrain using digital elevation models and cost
functions. While SEXTANT was mainly used for traverse
planning in the BASALT research program (Brady et al.,
2019), it has the capability of real-time adaptive replanning
that could be used within an EVA.
BASALT also incorporated compact field instruments
with real-time data return, which allowed the EV crew to
complete in situ analyses and send the results back to the
MSC (Sehlke et al., 2019). The information provided by
these instruments was used in the presampling survey
phase of our EVAs to down-select the candidate sample
locations before final sampling. Down-selection was fa-
cilitated by using a dynamic leaderboard created using a
spreadsheet (Figs. 1–3), which allowed the MSC to place
the candidates in a priority order depending on the infor-
mation delivered by the EV crew at various periods
throughout EVA execution. The leaderboard represented
the MSC preferences on a moment-by-moment basis based
on the latest information provided by the EV/IV team. The
MSC was frequently queried to ensure consensus was
made among the various scientific experts particularly at
key phases of the EVA.
The dynamic leaderboard formed an important part of the
decision-making in the EVA and had a member of the MSC
dedicated to updating and maintaining it (see Payler et al.,
2019). It allowed for the constant reprioritization of candi-
date locations without having to reassess all the previous
candidates. Because only the highest-priority candidates
needed to be transmitted to EV crew to allow them to
continue the next phase of the EVA, time-critical decisions
only required each new candidate to be assessed relatively
against the top candidates in the leaderboard and a new
priority list of 3–5 candidates sent. The leaderboard used in
BASALT assisted in these decisions by including descrip-
tions of the different candidate locations, reasoning for their
priority related to the EVA objectives, and images of the
candidate for quick reference.
Extravehicular activity plans were established days,
weeks, or even months in advance, using information from a
number of sources, including aerial photographs and mul-
tispectral data (Brady et al., 2019). An example traverse
plan is shown in Fig. 4. Each EVA plan consisted of a short
traverse and a selected number of stations for the astronauts
to visit and collect sample suites from.
Extravehicular activities were organized into discrete
activities arranged in a number of phases (Figs. 5 and 6).
Activities were assigned blocks in the planned timelines. A
detailed breakdown of EVA structure and tasks is given in
the work of Beaton et al. (2019a).
In each of these phases, decision-making operated dif-
ferently, as summarized schematically in Fig. 4 and in list
form in Table 1. EVAs began with a recon phase in which
the EV crew moved between three planned stations and
FIG. 1. Example screenshot of an EVA leaderboard master sheet, filled in by the personnel assigned to Leaderboard in the
MSC. For each candidate marker placed by the EV crew, a summary of the science discussion in the MSC was included and
the candidate given a priority for the second and third EVA phases. Note that not all candidates were given a priority, if they
were deemed not to meet the EVA’s science objectives. If samples were collected from a candidate, the container numbers
were included for archival purposes. The full MSC does not see this version of the leaderboard, but examples are shown in
Fig. 2 or Fig. 3 depending on the phase of the EVA. The marker labels were AA, AB, AC, and so on for the first station and
BA, BB, . and CA, CB, . for the second and third station, respectively. As the leaderboard was prepared under time
pressure, slang was often used. SBT =Science Backroom Team, an alternative name for the Science Support Team.
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searched for candidates as defined by the scientific objective
for the EVA. During this search, the EV crew provided
information using vocal descriptions, photographs, and vi-
deo (where bandwidth allowed) and proposed sample loca-
tions by placing markers with alphabetical codes. The MSC
used the contextual information provided to down-select the
candidate locations proposed by the EV crew and assemble
a leaderboard (Payler et al., 2019).
In the second phase, the EV crew return to candidate
locations they have identified and use stand-off and con-
tact instrumentation, including portable X-ray fluorescence
(XRF) and visible and near-infrared (VNIR) spectroscopy,
to provide mineralogical and geochemical information
about the candidate sample locations (Sehlke et al., 2019).
Critically, in both of these phases the EV crew aimed to
avoid contamination where possible and limit their travel
around the vicinity to reduce cross-contamination, with a
mind to wind direction (as identified in the contextual
survey at the beginning of the EVA). They did use rock
hammers and other tools to explore the general geology of
the site but avoided contact with any potential sampling
location. This is in contrast to Apollo EVAs or prior analog
deployments that were not astrobiology-focused, where
crewmembers could explore the site in as much depth as
they wanted before sampling, as contamination was not a
factor.
After the MSC prioritized the candidate sample locations
for the final phase using verbal descriptions, contextual
FIG. 2. An example of a presampling survey leaderboard derived from the backend shown in Fig. 1. Note no candidate at
position 8, due to the MSC placing very low priority on Candidate BB.
FIG. 3. An example of a final sampling leaderboard derived from the backend shown in Fig. 1. Note only two candidates
were included after the presampling survey.
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photographs, and instrument data, the EVA moved into the
sampling phase. At this point, decision-making in the MSC
was limited and became more about the crew on the ground
deciding how best to extract a particular sample. While the
MSC could make limited contributions that were highly
dependent on the latency condition and rate that the EV crew
worked at, this phase relied heavily on the prior training of
the EV crew in sterile sampling methods.
Each EVA phase is sequenced in some part to ensure that
EV crew downtime is minimized. For example, after iden-
tifying and describing candidate locations at the first station,
the crew moves to the next station and repeats the candidate
location search in the new area. MSC processes the infor-
mation from the first station and prioritizes the candidate
locations while EV are at the second station, meaning that
even under the 15min latency condition, the EV crew re-
ceive the location priority information before moving back
to this location; thus, the EV crew are not left waiting for
information, wasting resources and consumables on the
martian surface. This is in contrast to rover mission ConOps
(e.g., Moores et al., 2012), which may include periods of
idle time during data processing and interpretation. In the
case of a rover, this idle time is undesirable though perhaps
necessary when power-limited, as the rover must have regular
periods of idleness when using solar panels to recharge. In the
case of a crewed mission, EV crew idle time means wastage
of mission-critical consumables. In general, we aimed to
avoid EV crew waiting for a response from the MSC by
having clearly defined ‘‘bingo times’’ that identified the latest
time in which particular information must be sent by the
MSC to keep the EV crew on schedule. These bingo times
were monitored and managed by the SciCom position within
the MSC and by the IV crew (Payler et al., 2019).
In the early phases of the EVA, the MSC made decisions
in a framework established by the information provided to
them by the EV/IV crew, whereas in the later phases of the
EVA the EV/IV crew made decisions within the framework
of priorities (and reasoning) provided to them by the MSC.
We will examine these in turn.
3.1. Phase 1—Site recon and candidate search
In the initial phase of the EVA, the EV crew navigated to
a station waypoint, as defined in the EVA plan, using GPS
FIG. 4. An example of a traverse plan created in the xGDS software, with local aerial photography and an overlaid
(partially transparent) multispectral map. The EVA took place on Mauna Ulu (crater visible bottom left) and targeted
potential alteration products highlighted by multispectral data. There were three stations, with one waypoint used to prevent
cross-contamination of stations by guiding the EV crew to walk in from a particular direction that would bypass the other
stations. The yellow line is the straight-line path between waypoints, and the orange line is the traverse path calculated by
SEXTANT as the optimal walking path. Each station is an area with a diameter of 10m (interior yellow circle) for the EV
crew to explore and search for potential samples. The larger yellow circle around each station is provided to create buffer
zones of increased caution regarding potential contamination of candidate samples, as well as extensions to the station area
as necessary to meet the EVA objectives.
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FIG. 5. A schematic view of the EVA timeline and the decision-making within it. Decisions are initially made by the EV/
IV crew, choosing candidates and sending them to the MSC. When they receive candidate information, the MSC begins
creating and updating leaderboards, sending them to EV/IV as they progress, which continues until a deadline set by the
OWLT (5 or 15min) for the experimental condition, at which point they must have sent at least one version of the
leaderboard to allow EV/IV to move on to the next phase of the EVA. During the presampling survey, the EV/IV decision-
making is much more limited, and their tasks mainly consist of sending more detailed information to the MSC to allow them
to choose which candidates should be sampled. The leaderboards in each phase are continuously updated in response to new
information and can be sent many times, as long as the EV/IV crew have at least one priority to work from at the beginning
of the next section.
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and directions from the IV crew. Once at a station waypoint,
the EV crew members provided a contextual survey of the
area around the station using a combination of verbal de-
scriptions, video footage, and photographs at varying reso-
lution including orientation and scale markers. Figures 6
and 7 give examples of the cuff checklists used by the EV
crew as prompts for what descriptions they should be making
at different stages in the EVA. The video from the EV crew
cameras was sent at 720p resolution but displayed on screens
in the MSC at a downscaled resolution around half this.
After giving a general context for the station, the EV crew
systematically explored the area and looked for candidate
sample locations that met the specific criteria as established
in the BASALT Science Matrix (Brady et al., 2019).
Whenever they identified a candidate, they placed a unique
marker and sent extensive verbal descriptions and still im-
ages of the proposed sample location (see Figs. 8 and 9 for
examples). Generally, one context image and one close-up
image were sent for each candidate, but this was not limited,
and sometimes the EV crew decided to take three or four.
These images were taken at 8 megapixel resolution in the
high-bandwidth condition and at 8 and 3 megapixel reso-
lution in the low-bandwidth condition, with only the 3
megapixel images available to the MSC. For our science
objectives, which were differentiated by different types and
gradings of basaltic alteration, critical descriptions and im-
aging focused on the colors and textures of the alteration in
and around the candidate locations. By comparing the de-
scriptions made by EV crew and the images they sent back,
the MSC decided (a) if a candidate matched one of the al-
teration conditions required by the science objectives and (b)
if it was a better or worse example of this alteration condition
than what had been previously found by the EV crew.
This phase of the EVA (defined as contextual survey and
sample location search) was limited to 30min per station but
was not limited in the number of markers that the crew
could put down. After the allotted 30min, the crew would
move to the next station and repeat the process. This limit
was thought to be enough time to make an initial exploration
of the area while enabling the crew to cover multiple po-
tential locations within to the total time limit of the EVA.
The limit could be overridden by the scientist EV crew
member if they deemed the station important enough to
warrant it and the additional time did not break any of the
flight rules.
This first phase is therefore dominated by decisions made
primarily by the EV crew, with support from the IV crew,
who have real-time access to the video and photographs
relayed by the EV crew. While the stations are predeter-
mined in planning, the crew has autonomy in choosing the
FIG. 6. Example cuff checklist giving the EV crew direction on what they should be doing at each stage of the EVA.
TOPs =Targets of Opportunity, SA = Situational Awareness, FST = Field Support Team, ASD =Handheld VNIR spec-
trometer (later supplemented by a portable XRF unit).
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Table 1. Timeline of a BASALT EVA, Showing the Timing of EV/IV and MSC Activities under Different
Communication Latency and Allowing for Exploration of Three Stations in One Site
(Continued)
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Table 1. (Continued)
378 STEVENS ET AL.
possible sample locations to mark within the stations. Their
choices were based on their own training and prior field ex-
perience, directed by the scientific objectives of the EVA. For
each candidate sample marker, EV2 would provide a verbal
description of the marked location, including a statement of
what EVA science objective this possible sample location
would meet. EV1 would provide context and close-up photos
of the marked location with scale bars (1m staff with smaller
increments marked with tape). Three to six candidate loca-
tions were chosen per station. This collection of information
(voice descriptions, notes from IV crew, and images) was
transmitted back to the MSC (and viewed in xGDS), where
they discussed and ranked each candidate location.
A predetermined imaging protocol gave the EV crew
guidance for how to take images at each phase of the EVA.
Each station began with four images in the four cardinal
directions, with scale bars in the foreground, to provide a
general context for the station. This also gave a visual cue to
the MSC that a new station was being explored. After this,
each station typically involved several overall contextual
images and three to five candidate locations (the maximum
was six, but the number was not constrained by anything
other than time), each with at least two images—context
(Fig. 8) and close-up (Fig. 9). This collection of images and
description formed the parameter space of information that
the MSC then used to rank the candidate locations. Typi-
cally the close-up images were the most useful information
for the MSC, as they were generally able to discriminate
different alteration types by eye. However, in many cases
the MSC relied on the EV’s own scientific interpretation of
the location and used their confidence to decide on a priority
order. The thoughts and recommendations of the EV crew
were captured by stenographers in the MSC, as these could
easily be lost among the MSC discussions. Following the
sequencing of the imaging protocol was critical, as the in-
formation in each image had to be tied semantically to the
verbal descriptions provided by the EV crew.
As soon as information on the first candidate location was
received by the MSC across the OWLT delay, the MSC
began assessing and prioritizing the information on a dy-
namic leaderboard to identify which candidate locations
should receive further scrutiny using the scientific instru-
ments carried by the EV crew during the second phase of the
EVA (presampling survey). The leaderboard was updated as
data for each candidate sample was received and assessed,
and the current list was transmitted back to IV crew through
Playbook with short notes on the MSC’s rationale for the
order. The MSC had a time-critical deadline (bingo time) to
respond to the IV crew with a prioritized leaderboard of as
many of the candidate samples as possible before the EV
crew finished exploring the third station; remaining candi-
date samples from the third station that had not been inte-
grated into the leaderboard were continually added as the
EV crew progressed through the presampling survey phase.
The limit placed by the OWLT on the first leaderboard
response was the first critical decision-making point in
the EVA, as without at least one priority recommendation
the EV crew could not move on to the next phase, so the
leaderboard had to be sent at least 5 or 15min in advance.
Synthesizing the recommendations of the different mem-
bers of the MSC was assigned to the two Biology and
Geology Leads, who each reported a final recommendation
to the Science Lead. The recommendations were most of-
ten in accordance, but in some cases there was a difference,
highlighting the need for the MSC Lead to be a scientist by
training. The Science lead used these recommendations to
make a final decision on the leaderboard prioritization,
which was then sent to the IV crew (Payler et al., 2019).
FIG. 7. Example cuff checklist giving theEVcrew information onwhat they should describe about the candidate sample locations.
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From the perspective of the EV crew, the exploration of
the three stations was followed sequentially by receiving the
candidate leaderboard and moving on to the next phase.
Conversely, from the perspective of the MSC, these events
were occurring in parallel—they had to send a leaderboard
before the EV crew finished at the first station, and while EV
were working at the next station the MSC was still looking
at information from the previous one. This meant that the
MSC was continuously reprioritizing the leaderboard in re-
sponse to new information received from the EV crew. After
the initial, time-critical transmission of the leaderboard, the
pressure on the MSC was relieved slightly, and they had
some time to continue science-focused discussions and rep-
rioritize the entire table. In some cases, the leaderboard was
completely reordered in response to these discussions.
Because of the structure of the planned EVAs, there was
a subtlety to the initial prioritization in the dynamic lead-
erboard. During the candidate sample location search,
when the dynamic leaderboard for the upcoming pre-
sampling survey was being built, the highest-priority can-
didate was not necessarily what the MSC thought was the
highest sampling priority, but rather the candidate that they
most wanted scanned with the scientific instruments in
order to enable better decisions on the eventual sampling
priority. For example, where one candidate had been
identified for the primary science objective, but several
candidates had been identified for the secondary science
objective, the MSC prioritized the multiple secondary
candidates for instrument scanning to allow these to be
ordered appropriately beneath the primary candidate. In
this case, the top priority in the presampling survey lead-
erboard would not be the same as the top priority in the
sampling leaderboard.
3.2. Phase 2—Presampling survey
Before the beginning of the presampling phase, the EV/
IV crew should have received a prioritized list of locations
to move back to and assess in more detail using scientific
instruments. In our EVAs, this target was always met; but if
it had not been, the EV/IV protocol was to begin working on
their own initial priority rather than waiting for input. De-
pending on the specific context of the EVA, the highest
priority could be from the first or second station, or in the
case of a 5min OWLT, the third station as well. At this
stage in the EVA, the EV crew had an extensive number of
FIG. 8. An example of a context image of a sample marker laid by EV crew, identifying a potential fumarole for later sampling.
EVA procedures called for an initial context image with a scale bar, followed by close-up shots of the proposed sample location.
Note themarker and scale bar are laid away from the location intended for sampling (the crack between the ‘‘CA’’ marker and the
scale bar) to prevent contamination. In some cases it was necessary tomake the intended target clearer by pointingwith improvised
devices, but this information was mostly relayed over voice communication and recorded by stenographers in the MSC.
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tasks to accomplish but few decisions to make. They worked
autonomously within the list of candidates given to them by
the MSC to provide more information, with some decisions
about how best to achieve this, but only in a minor sense. They
could choose exactly where in an outcrop to sample but not
which outcrop to sample. The EV crew were also given some
autonomy in determining the order in which they would visit
the candidate sample sites. For example, in some cases they
could visit candidates at Station 2 first because it was closer to
their current position. In some cases the MSC felt they lacked
some information and deferred to the EV to use their best
judgment as to which of two sites was a better example.
The EV crew used handheld instruments to scan repre-
sentative surfaces at the candidate locations and transmitted
the resulting data, as well as additional photographs (which
were typically close-ups) and observations, back to the MSC.
This phase in the EVA was less structured in the timeline,
without specific intervals assigned for the three separate
stations, as the leaderboard could have candidate locations
from any of the three stations in any order. However, there
was again a critical cutoff time where the MSC needed to
provide an updated leaderboard to EV/IV in order for them
to move to the sampling phase. In many ways this phase
of the EVA was similar to the first. Working within a pre-
determined plan, the EV crew transmitted information to
the MSC that allows them to down-select candidates for the
next phase. The MSC perceives these actions to be happening
in parallel, whereas the EV crew perceive them sequentially,
and the IV crew experiences a hybrid of the two, as they are
managing the information flow between MSC and EV.
The aim of the second phase was to critically refine the
priority listing on the leaderboard based on additional in-
formation offered by the handheld instruments. This meant
the decision-making was slightly different in the two phases.
In Phase 1, decisions needed to be made about whether can-
didates met the science objectives for the EVA, which of the
candidates appeared to be better examples of the conditions
described by the science objectives, but also which of the
candidates required further investigation to answer these
questions. In Phase 2, the only decisions were which of the
candidates were the best matches to the science objectives,
but additional information was provided to the MSC.
3.3. Phase 3—Sampling
The final phase of the EVA involved relatively little
decision-making on the part of the MSC. Once the candidate
samples had been prioritized and the sampling leaderboard
transmitted back to EV/IV, there was little to do except
sample. Theoretically it would be possible for the MSC to
FIG. 9. An example of a close-up shot of the same sample marker as Fig. 8, laid by EV crew to identify a candidate
fumarole location for sampling. EV made the target clear to MSC in this case by pointing with a scale bar.
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change the second-priority sample location while the EV
crew was sampling the first priority, perhaps if they con-
tinued analyzing photographs and data and changed their
mind, but in practice this did not happen.
Despite the majority of the decision-making being com-
plete, there was still work for the MSC to do in the final
phase. EV crew continued transmitting verbal descriptions and
photographs, providing the MSC with further information that
they could use to interpret and assess the samples being taken.
In addition, there was a significant amount of ‘‘book-keeping’’
work such as completing notes, tagging photographs, and
matching sample numbers to sample bags (see Fig. 10).
4. Results and Analysis
A number of metrics were collected on all aspects of the
BASALT research program. These will be discussed in
depth elsewhere (Beaton et al., 2019b); here we focus on the
qualitative results applicable to tactical decision-making.
4.1. Crew and MSC roles
The liaison roles (Biology Lead and Geology Lead
feeding to Science Lead, and the SciCom who communi-
cates between Science Lead and IV) between EV/IV and
MSC proved to be critical in enabling efficient decision-
making, as the communication between the two groups was
critical. Information flow was mainly one way, from EV/IV
to MSC, but there is important information that the MSC
must send to EV/IV in a clear and efficient way, via text
communication through Playbook. With a large MSC, it was
important to have liaison roles staffed by those able to
consolidate the group decision-making, emphasize time-
critical cut-offs, and send the digested information to EV/
IV. Our formal MSC structure (Payler et al., 2019) had two
science subleads (Geology and Biology) who digested
information from a subset of the MSC and deferred to one
overall Science Lead, who could then consolidate this in-
formation and break any deadlocks that might have hap-
pened between the two teams. The particular techniques of
the Science Lead role depended heavily on the personality
of the person in the role, as these were rotated—some sent
far more but often shorter messages than others, whereas
some tended to use a ‘‘digest’’ format sent less often. There
was not an appreciable difference in outcome between the
different styles of Science Lead (Payler et al., 2019).
Another MSC role that proved to be critical was that of
the Stenographer, and in fact having multiple independent
Stenographers listening to the voice channels of the EV crew.
Because the MSC was continuously receiving new infor-
mation while also discussing this information and making
decisions, different members of the MSC often missed im-
portant incoming information from the EV and IV crew
while the MSC members worked together to assess data that
had been previously received. Having several appropriately
trained members of the MSC focused on the voice discus-
sions between EV and IV meant they could alert the rest
of the team to any important information that might have
been missed during discussions at a time that was most
FIG. 10. A suite of samples collected from a ‘‘CE’’ candidate location. Each set of sampling ended with a similar
photograph of sample bags in situ to provide context and specific localization.
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appropriate for the MSC (e.g., after a given discussion about
a past set of information was completed).
The importance of scientific training was also incredibly
important for the EV crew. Because the MSC can only make
decisions on information provided by the EV crew, that
information must be of high quality. Verbal descriptions
needed to be clear and concise but carry enough detail.
Photographs needed to be appropriately framed and scaled.
Having all members of the EV and IV crew well trained in
what to look for when identifying candidates meant infor-
mation flow was not dependent on the single ‘‘scientist’’ EV
crew member, as both of the EV crew could cover different
areas of the stations (in the search phase), but also that EV/
IV could engage in useful real-time discussions that often
helped resolve a scientific question without having to defer
to the MSC and wait for a response. It also meant that the
EV crew could have input, which was prompted for by the
IV crew as part of the EVA protocol, into the eventual
ranking in the leaderboard or choosing between two equally
ranked candidates, which proved to be very useful when there
were unclear or borderline candidates, and the MSC placed a
high weight on the opinions of the EV crew where given.
4.2. Capabilities
A number of technological capabilities were identified as
being important to the decision-making process. TheBASALT
research program uses xGDS software as its main tool (Mar-
quez et al., 2019), which allows for EVA planning and con-
solidation of text, video, photographic and instrument data. A
tool like this, which has been developed over a number of
analog projects, proved to be invaluable for enabling the MSC
tomake decisions, given the large number of data streams they
must evaluate information from. Being able to quickly switch
between images annotated with metadata and glance at real-
time video from the field allowed the scientists in the MSC to
essentially ‘‘inhabit’’ the same space as the EV crew, enabling
a much deeper scientific understanding of the sampling con-
text. Another aspect of the system that proved to be useful was
the ability to annotate images from the field to send back toEV/
IV with specific directions. In cases where the MSC wanted to
be very specific about what they wanted to sample, verbal
descriptions were not adequate to pass on the required infor-
mation. However, as these cases were relatively rare, it was not
possible to accurately assess how critical this capability was.
The planned timeline and procedures for BASALT EVAs
required constant communications, even though they were
subject to latency. Procedures and flight rules were included
that allowed EV and IV to react to a loss of communications
with the MSC or between each other, which did happen on a
few occasions, but most of the time these reactive proce-
dures did not affect the scientific decision-making as this
was reduced in priority compared to safety in these cases. In
a real Mars mission, where infrastructure such as relay or-
biters will most likely be restricted, communications might
be regular but interrupted, and the BASALT timeline con-
cept would need to be adapted. Restricted twice-a-day
communication downlinks would not easily be catered for
under our operations concept, and the MSC would be far
less able to influence science operations. In fact, MSC
members said that hearing the thought processes of EV and
IV was absolutely critical for understanding the context
information they provided, which would not be possible in
twice-a-day communications (Bleacher et al., 2013).
4.3. Effect of different study conditions
Our study conditions involved low and high latency cases
and low and high bandwidth cases. Each of these cases
brought its own challenges and learning points. The EVA
timeline in our study was designed to accommodate the high
latency case, so for example the sample location search at
each station was planned to take 30min, allowing approxima-
tely for the 15min OWLT transmission from EV/IV and re-
sponse from MSC. This schedule assisted the MSC in making
decisions on the scientific information, as they had time to
process it before the next phase (with each phase generally
involving an activity three times), though this relied on the
MSC being provided sufficient information by the EV crew.
However, there was an interesting juxtaposition of the
perception of how much the MSC could influence the EVA
activities and the time pressures introduced by the com-
munication latency. In the 5min OWLT low latency case,
where the critical time cut-offs for MSC decision-making
were 10min later than in the 15min OWLT high latency
case, the decisions in MSC were generally more ‘‘frantic’’
and pressured in an attempt to influence the EVA more
directly. This is counterintuitive but seemed related to the
fact that the MSC felt better connected to the EV crew under
low latency, whereas under high latency there was less
opportunity to directly influence the EV crew. In the high
latency case, where critical time cut-offs were earlier, there
seemed to be a more ‘‘measured’’ approach as the MSC
knew that it was more limited in how much it could influ-
ence the EVA. The more measured and relaxed approach
meant that outside of the critical bingo times, the MSC
waited for more information and was more methodical in
analyzing it, while being mindful of the fact they had a
deadline to make a decision. For example, in the high la-
tency case, repeated updates of the leaderboard were often
not sent as the MSC was aware they would have arrived too
late to influence the next phase. However, in this case it was
more important for the MSC to include precise reasoning for
their priority list in the leaderboard, as it was more difficult
for the IV crew to ask for clarification from them.
The main effect of the low bandwidth study case was that
continuous video feeds were not transmitted to the MSC and
the resolution of the photographs transmitted by EV crew
was reduced (IV crew still retained access to the high-
resolution imagery and video feeds). In general, the con-
tinuous video feed was a useful capability for the MSC as it
allowed them quickly and simply to locate themselves with
the EV crew and to understand the context of the sample
locations. However, the lack of real-time video in the low
bandwidth case was not severely detrimental and did not
significantly alter the decision-making process, as multiple
context photographs alongside extensive verbal descriptions
were able to convey a large portion of this contextual in-
formation. The loss of high-resolution photographs (8
megapixel) in the MSC was not found to be detrimental, as
the close-up, low-resolution (3 megapixel) versions were
more than adequate for scientific interpretations of the
geochemistry. Verbal descriptions and moderate-resolution
images were more than sufficient for tactical decision-making.
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4.4. Procedures
Although having EV crew sufficiently trained to recog-
nize appropriate samples and make decisions about their
quality proved to be an important consideration, we found
that the EV crew often spent too long deciding whether a
candidate was of a high-enough quality to place a candidate
marker. While this was meaningful and important scientific
decision-making, our ConOps placed this decision in the
hands of the MSC. With MSC support, the EV crew should
aim to place markers and move on, giving the MSC a wider
choice to prioritize from rather than attempting to do this
themselves. In the procedures developed for BASALT op-
erations, EV crew made important decisions in what infor-
mation to pass to the MSC; doing this in a systematic way
that included important contextual details only evident to a
well-trained crew member proved to be incredibly impor-
tant. However, once they had collected that information,
it wasmuchmore useful for them to place candidatemarkers at
any potential sample location, rather than trying to threshold
their quality during the EVA. This contrasts with the meth-
odology used by astronauts in Apollo, where it was the as-
tronauts that had the final say in whether to sample or not
(Clark, 2010). In fact, there were some cases where discus-
sions between the EV and IV crew about whether or not to
place a candidate marker created confusion in the MSC. This
confusion could be avoided by having a procedure that EV
crew place a marker before they start discussing candidates.
Our experience also suggests that because EVA timelines
were planned with the high OWLT latency case in mind, it
was more beneficial for the EV crew to use up the allotted
time in each activity rather than push to move to the next
activity early. This meant where time gains were made, EV
crew were better to push to find more candidate locations in
the first phase, or perform more instrument scans of more
representative samples in the second phase, than press ahead
to the next station or candidate location. In general, sticking
to the timeline allowed the MSC more time to process the
information, especially in the high latency condition, re-
ducing confusion, preventing the MSC from being over-
whelmed, and keeping the two teams synced across latency.
This is in contrast to previous analog missions without la-
tency, where it has been found to be more useful to press to
the next activity (Yingst et al., 2013), but must be balanced
with operational and safety concerns. Determining this bal-
ance was one of the goals of the BASALT program. In a real
sequence of Mars surface EVAs over the course of years, the
OWLT will change, and EVA timelines might have to be
adapted; but in the case of a short-duration surface mission
over the course of days, the time allotted to each activity
could be planned with the specific OWLT in mind.
Overall, the procedures developed for the BASALT re-
search program enabled high-quality scientific decisions.
There were numerous examples where issues were identified
with the procedures, and there were some occasions where
communication breakdowns caused failures where decisions
made in the MSC were not actioned correctly by the EV
crew. However, to truly qualify whether our procedures
improved scientific decisions over different procedures
would require more extensive investigation, oversampling,
and a method to critically assess the ‘‘quality’’ of samples,
which was beyond the scope of this deployment. Never-
theless, the development of our procedures over the course
of several deployments meant that while we did not com-
pletely achieve our scientific objectives in simulation dur-
ing the first deployment (requiring additional, non-mission
simulation sample collection), all scientific objectives were
met in simulated EVAs in our second deployment.
4.5. Critical observations and information
In our study, the observations and information that were
critical for decision-making were tied very closely to the
science questions set at a program level. In general, the
close-up images taken by the EV crew and sent to the MSC
were the science data products most frequently relied upon
to make decisions on priority in the MSC. These provided
clear evidence of the different alteration conditions that
informed our top-level science objectives. In some cases,
data from handheld geochemical instruments or verbal de-
scriptions supplemental to the images were used to confirm
or refute the interpretation of the alteration conditions in the
images, but rarely did they provide a completely different
interpretation. However, this supplemental information was
key when the MSC had to make a decision about which can-
didates to prioritize within the context of one specific science
objective. Where some images were able to show us which
rocks were ‘‘highly altered’’ or ‘‘unaltered’’ (for example),
the detailed geochemical information provided by the in-
struments, and the strength of opinion of the EV crew, who
had much a much better direct sense of the context and envi-
ronment, were key in how the MSC prioritized the candidates.
In cases where the science objective of an EVA or the
exploration in general is different, perhaps with a science
question that is not as immediately visually obvious or one
that is an example of a more binary than gradated condition,
the balance of critical information might be different. This
would suggest that when designing a generalized EVA for
future Mars exploration, where the specific science objective
is unknown and may vary significantly from instance to in-
stance, it would be most beneficial to maintain the different
streams of information available, as each stream might offer
critical importance in different contexts.
5. Conclusions
A crewed astrobiology sampling Mars surface mission
presents a unique context for scientific decision-making that
has not been previously encountered by human exploration.
The scientific objectives, contamination restrictions, com-
munication latency, and bandwidth limitations all combine
to form what will be a challenging activity for those people
we send to explore the martian surface. A key point of the
BASALT program has been to show explicitly that a MSC
located on Earth can provide added value to astronauts
performing astrobiological sampling on the surface of Mars,
despite a communication latency and data transmission limi-
tations between the two groups. With appropriate planning
and timelining of activities and MSC staffing, a significant
amount of decision-making can be offloaded from the crew
on Mars to the MSC, which can contain far wider and
deeper scientific knowledge and experience than the smaller
EV and IV crew member team possibly can. Despite this
fact, having crew members with a broad training in the
appropriate geological and biological sciences proved to be
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critically important. Because the MSC can only make de-
cisions within the scope of the information provided to them
by the EV crew, it is important that the crew on the ground
are able to identify interesting potential samples, explain
why they are interesting, and understand how best to char-
acterize them to pass on to the MSC.
Our simulations also demonstrated that there are a num-
ber of critical technological capabilities that need to be in
place for such a mission. While constant video feeds from
crew-mounted cameras proved useful, they rarely provided
contextual information above and beyond what could be
extracted from photographs taken by the crew, as long as
those images followed the predetermined and systematic
imaging protocol. However, uninterrupted voice communi-
cation was key in enabling the MSC to understand the
reasoning of EV crew by listening to their thought processes
and discussion with IV crew. Being able to send close-up
photographs at reasonable resolution was the main route for
scientific information to be passed from EV through IV and
to MSC. It was also important that the photographs could
be directed by the (highly scientifically trained) EV crew,
rather than remotely operated for example, as they are
necessarily in the best position to judge the best subject,
contrast, and scale appropriately. With the development
of more intuitive and user-friendly contact or stand-off
geochemical instrumentation, the integration of these data
products and their remote transmission may change the
balance of information usefulness in future tests.
While other analog programs have investigated similar
questions of decision-making and how science teams can op-
erate in simulated extraterrestrial missions, there is little avail-
able literature detailing the background of particular protocols
chosen, or examining in detail the results of these choices. We
would encourage the community to publish more on these as-
pects of their investigations, as these discussions are clearly of
interest as we move toward the human exploration of Mars.
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BASALT¼Biologic Analog Science Associated
with Lava Terrains
ConOps¼ concepts of operations
EV¼Extra-Vehicular
EVAs¼ extravehicular activities
IV¼ Intra-Vehicular
MSC¼Mission Support Center
OWLT¼ one-way light time
VNIR¼ visible and near-infrared
XRF¼X-ray fluorescence
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